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## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

March 23, 1983

tations of these types of behavior can only aid those who are suffering within the Soviet Union. The aim of the vigil here in the Senate is that not a week will go by without at least one Member of the Chamber voicing his or her strong opposition to the treatment of individuals in the Soviet Union.

The evidence concerning Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union is clear. In 1979, emigration reached an all-time high; 51,000 Jews were allowed to leave the Soviet Union for the country of their choice. In stark contrast to that figure, only 2,670 Jews emigrated from the Soviet Union in 1982. That constitutes a 95-percent drop in the number of exit visas issued by the Soviet Government. Let me assure you, Mr. President, that the number of applications for such visas has not decreased. During the first several months of Mr. Andropov's tenure, we have seen emigration cut back even further. This trend is alarming, and it is one which we cannot accept.

At the same time, government repression of Jewish activities within the Soviet Union has increased both quantitatively and qualitatively. The pressures which the Soviet Government is putting on its people not only prevent them from moving permanently to the place of their choice, but also from traveling within the country as they wish, from raising and educating their children as they wish, from worshipping as they would like, and from maintaining many of their cultural traditions. Jewish cultural and scientific seminars have been broken up, academic degrees have been stripped from Soviet Jews, university educations have been denied to children of refuseniks, and, as we all know, prominent advocates of Jewish cultural rights and emigration have been arrested and imprisoned. If I had not been in the Soviet Union myself, it would be difficult for me to imagine this type of life. But like many of my colleagues, I have had the opportunity to travel to the Soviet Union; I know that this is the only life that most Soviet Jews have ever known. And it is getting worse every day for both Soviet Jews and Christians alike.

The Congress of the United States must take a strong and visible stand against these policies. By action and word, we must make it clear to the Soviet Government that it is not acceptable to the citizens or the Congress of the United States that the Government of the Soviet Union imprisons many Jewish citizens without just cause; nor is it acceptable that thousands of other Soviet Jews are denied permission to leave that country.

Mr. President, this is a particularly important time in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. I believe that it is critical that in the midst of our discussion on arms control and many other issues of tremendous importance, we not forget our responsibility to the refuseniks.

We have a great many things in common with these people, yet they lack so many of the basic freedoms which we take for granted.

Americans and all people who value human dignity and basic human rights must take every opportunity to speak out on behalf of all those in the Soviet Union who are being denied the basic rights which all people deserve. I urge my colleagues to join those of us who are a part of the Senate Call to Conscience Vigil for Soviet Jewry.

Mr. President, today I would like to express my particular concern for Faina and Naum Kogen. The Kogens are like thousands of other Jews in the Soviet Union: Despite their earnest desire to leave that country and live elsewhere, they are unable to do so because the Soviet officials will not grant them exit visas. Yet, in another way, the Kogens are quite different from other Jews in the Soviet Union. Since coming to the Senate, I have worked on behalf of the Kogens. I have written to Soviet and American officials regarding the plight of the Kogens; I have been in contact with friends and family of the Kogens who live outside the Soviet Union and who are deeply concerned about this situation; and, I have received letters from the Kogens and I have personally had an opportunity to visit with them when I was in the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, I feel that Faina and Naum Kogen are my friends. Yet these friends are being detained against their fervent wishes in a land where they have virtually no freedom. Last year Naum Kogen had a heart attack; Faina suffers from chronic bronchitis and stenocardia. It is often impossible for them to obtain the appropriate medical care. And the things in life which mean the most to them—freedom to practice their religious and cultural traditions, and the opportunity to be with family and friends, are denied them. The Kogens' son lives here in the United States and would welcome the chance to care for his parents.

I appeal to those in the Soviet Union who have the authority to issue to the Kogens the necessary papers to allow them to leave that country. Indeed, I call upon these officials to recognize the rights due to the Kogens and to all human beings everywhere by allowing these people the right to choose where they want to live.

Mr. President, many other people share the problems which the Kogens are experiencing. I trust that the Senate of the United States will recognize that this is also our problem. As long as the basic rights of any people in any country are being so flagrantly and persistently denied, we, too, are suffering. We must not remain silent while other people are being victimized by the Government of the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, I yield the balance of the time remaining to the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. HUDDLESTON. I thank the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President, may I inquire of how much time is remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 10 minutes remaining.

Mr. HUDDLESTON. I thank the Chair.

# SELECTIVE DECLASSIFICATION OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL

Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President, I rise to discuss a matter of deep concern to me and, I hope, to my colleagues. Tonight the President plan nationwide television address which, according to press reports, will include selected intelligence photographs that are being declassified for the purpose of supporting the President's case.

I came on this floor 2 weeks ago today to express my dismay at the growing politicization of our Nation's foreign intelligence and national defense operations. At that time I reviewed the repeated instances of selective release of classified information designed to promote administration policies, going back to the previous administration. And I cited the concerns of senior intelligence professionals about the manner in which intelligence has been used by policymakers.

Now we appear to be on the verge of another, even more dramatic, case of selective disclosure of national security information to promote one side of the debate. When the public sees the President's address, they will have no way of knowing whether the information he releases and the classified photographs he displays represent a balanced and objective view of the problem or a partial view designed to win popular support.

Let me remind my colleagues, the news media, and all citizens who see the President's address that this practice puts the President's opponents in Congress at a tremendous disadvantage. Individual Members of Congress and congressional committees do not have the lawful authority to declassify and release national security information. Only in the most exceptional cases does the Senate or House, under the rules establishing the Intelligence Committees, have authority to make such information public.

As a result, those who believe different evidence would support a policy other than the President's cannot use that classified information to support their point of view.

I would also like to call attention to two recent articles in the press that discuss this issue. On March 16, David S. Broder wrote a column in the Washington Post that talked about the President's recent directive aimed at reducing leaks. He correctly pointed out that every administration deplores leaks—unless the purpose of

# Senate

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 23, 1983

(Legislative day of Monday, March 21, 1983)

The Senate met at 10 a.m., on the expiration of the recess, and was called to order by the President pro tempore (Mr. THURMOND).

## PRAYER

The Chaplain, the Reverend Richard C. Halverson, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Let us pray:

Jehovah God of the Covenants old and new, as we enter the season of Passover and Easter, may we be mindful of the significant events in history which they celebrate. We praise Thee for the liberation of Israel after long years of bondage. We thank Thee for the incalculable contribution in the family, music, science, finance, the arts and business which Thy people, the Jews, have made to history.

We praise Thee for the gift of Thy Son, Saviour and Lord of History—for His peerless life, His selfless death as the Lamb of God which taketh away the sins of the world. We thank Thee for His victory over death and the grave in resurrection and for the promise of His re-entry into history to reign as king of kings and lord of lords. In His name we pray. Amen.

## RECOGNITION OF THE MAJORITY LEADER

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The majority leader is recognized.

Mr. BAKER. I thank the Chair.

## SENATE SCHEDULE

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I am reassured that I am recognized. I am so tired and worn out from the late evening last night I was not sure I had the same features.

Mr. President, we have a long day ahead of us. There are a number of amendments yet to be disposed of on the social security bill. I commend the managers on both sides of the aisle for the good progress they have made so far.

The Senate, however, was in session last night until almost midnight. We have been out of session for only about 10 hours, so people are tired, Members are tired, and for that reason, together obviously with the national interest, I urge that we move this bill as soon as possible, and I mean by that finish it.

So I join in the admonition of the minority leader last night that we set

about the business of finding time limitations and shorten this so that we can get on with the matter at hand.

I think it is essential that we finish this bill by early afternoon and be prepared to go to conference. It is still barely possible that we could finish the conference report on this bill tonight, but that is a receding possibility. It is more likely, I suppose, that the conference report will be taken up with the House on tomorrow and recess sometime during the day on Thursday.

In any event, Mr. President, it is urgently important that Members who have amendments come to the floor and offer them as soon as possible. That is the cheeriest note I can contrive after the short night, Mr. President.

Mr. President, there will be an amendment pending when we return to the consideration of this matter, and it will be the Baucus amendment No. 119, which is not printed.

## ORDER FOR PERIOD FOR TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. President, let me make one further request. I ask unanimous consent that after the recognition of the two leaders under the standing order, there be a period for the transaction of routine morning business of 1 minute in which Senators may speak.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DANFORTH). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I yield control of my time to the distinguished minority leader.

## RECOGNITION OF THE MINORITY LEADER

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority leader is recognized.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, those cheery notes coming from the other side of the aisle have a familiar and nostalgic ring.

Mr. BAKER. I have commented, if the Senator will yield, that good or bad, much of what I have learned has been learned at the knee of the distinguished minority leader when he was the majority leader. There is an old saying that one's sins come home to roost.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield my time to Mr. BOREN.

## 1983 VIGIL FOR SOVIET JEWRY

Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, today we begin an important effort here in the Senate to further the cause of human rights. I am proud to be Senate Chairman of the 1983 Call to Conscience Vigil for Soviet Jewry. Eighteen other Senators have already agreed to join me in this effort to call attention to the plight of thousands of people who are imprisoned in the Soviet Union or who have been denied permission to emigrate from that country. I trust that in the coming weeks, the rest of my colleagues will recognize the serious nature of this problem, and join us in this organized attempt to let the people of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the world know that the U.S. Congress will not tolerate the present situation.

Many of us have long been active on behalf of those who are being persecuted by the Soviet Government, and those refuseniks who, for one reason or another, simply are being prevented from leaving the Soviet Union. I applaud all of my colleagues who are involved in this type of effort. At the same time, I believe that we should take a lesson from the House of Representatives, where concerned Members have just begun the eighth annual Call to Conscience Vigil. Our colleagues on the House side have learned the value of a coordinated and persistent voice in bringing to bear some heavy pressure regarding the actions of the Soviet Government toward their own citizens. Of course, in situations like this, it is difficult to draw a precise relationship between cause and effect. However, the track record has been good. Many of those individuals and families who have been assisted by House Members have indeed been allowed to leave the Soviet Union. We here in the Senate also are aware of those on whose behalf we have spoken out who have since emigrated from the Soviet Union. It is not presumptuous for us to think that the Soviet Government does pay attention to the words and actions of the Congress of the United States. If we are silent, our silence announces to the Soviets that the matter of anti-Semitism within the Soviet Union, and the huge percentage of emigration applications which are denied by the Soviet Government, are unimportant to the United States. By contrast, our protes-

○ This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by the Member on the floor.

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the leak is to advance the President's policy line.

An article in the Washington Post of March 20 by author Fred Kaplan discussed some of the shortcomings in the use of reconnaissance photographs in classified briefings on the Soviet-United States military balance. Among other points, he suggests that such briefing do not include comparable classified photographs of U.S. weapons systems and thus do not put Soviet forces into a net assessment perspective.

I suspect that the President's address tonight will follow this pattern, with the emphasis on Soviet military capabilities instead of an objective net assessment of both sides.

It is very unfortunate that the President has adopted this course. We all recall when President Kennedy went before the American people with U-2 photographs of Soviet missiles in Cuba. We believed him—and the world believed him—because at that time classified intelligence was not released to the public except in the most exceptional situations involving bipartisan national security concerns.

Today the circumstances are entirely different. The selective release of classified information by authorized leaks or in public statements to promote particular policies has become commonplace. It undermines the credibility of our foreign intelligence and national defense agencies and of the institution of the Presidency itself.

I had hoped we could reverse this trend, but we cannot do so without the support and commitment of our national leaders.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that certain attachments, including the articles by David S. Broder and Fred Kaplan be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 16, 1983]

#### ONLY SOME LEAKS BUG PRESIDENTS

(By David S. Broder)

Nothing better illustrates the surrealistic, cracked-mirror character of government secrecy edicts than a pair of actions by President Reagan last week.

The president signed an executive order on Friday requiring all federal employees with security clearances—a number reaching into the hundreds of thousands—to submit to lie-detector tests in any investigation of leaked information, or suffer "adverse consequences" for refusing. On the very same day, he stonewalled a press conference question about leaks from his own senior staff that undermined the position of Environmental Protection Agency head Anne M. Burford in the days before her resignation. "I don't know of anything of that kind," Reagan said.

As an example of high comedy, you could hardly improve on that script.

Every reporter in town knows that Reagan did not have to walk more than 50 feet from the Oval Office to find people in his employ who were leaking like crazy that Burford would have to go. "I know that you were all citing these unnamed White Houses sources that thought she would resign," he

told reporters. "I still would like to find them out and identify them."

But he has not. Instead, he has issued the most sweeping secrecy edict in the history of the civil service. The seemingly misplaced emphasis reveals what no government—at least as long as I have worked in Washington—has ever wanted to acknowledge: what bugs a president is not leaks, but leaks from people who may disagree with him.

Time after time, in administration after administration, colleagues and I have sat in the office of some senior official who, promised anonymity, has divulged the substance of, or even read from, highly classified documents. The purpose, in almost every case, was to advance the president's policy line—in Vietnam, in some international negotiation, in some domestic political fight.

No, it's not the leaks that infuriate them. It's the leaks they don't control: the logs of private meetings with interested parties in regulatory matters, or evaluations of weapons systems that cast doubt on a multi-billion-dollar boondoggle. Those leaks, they say, are dangerous.

So be aware, dear reader, of what is really going to happen if Reagan is allowed to tie a lie-detector threat to the tail of every career official of any standing. It will not stop the leaks. The president or his people will no more play by the rules of the executive order than the Reagan aides obeyed his supposedly serious order to stand by the embattled Burford. What the executive order will do is shut down your access to information that may contradict or cause you to question the policy judgments of the president and his aides.

It will increase substantially the risks for anyone—bureaucrat or journalist—who wants you to hear the other side of the policy argument from the one the president is peddling. And, while it lasts, it will increase the odds that the policy adopted will be worse than it would have been had the rules of debate—or leaking—been applied evenhandedly to friends and foes of the president's policy.

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 20, 1983]

#### PENTAGON SUPERWEAPON: THE HAIR-RAISING BRIEFER

PAINTING THE RUSSIAN BEAR 10 FEET TALL

(By Fred Kaplan)

Deep inside the Pentagon, far behind those scenes occupied by the secretary of defense and his entourage of deputy and assistant secretaries, lie several separate, almost entirely unknown subcultures. In some of these specialized communities are the anonymous analysts who puzzle over their endless calculations; in other, the nuclear gurus who dream up doctrines and warfighting strategies; in still others, the professional briefers.

This last group is hardly the least important. Its inhabitants are commissioned to sell the wares of the powers that be. The dazzle or dreariness of their presentations can mean the difference between a weapon sold or rejected, a new idea advanced or squelched, a portrait of the Soviet threat embraced as truth or dismissed as flight of fantasy.

Standing out among these briefers, in a class all his own, is a soft-spoken, wiry, increasingly frail 54-year-old photo-intelligence analyst named John T. Hughes.

Few have heard of John Hughes, but in the coming months we're all likely to hear a great deal. For if a group of hawks on Capitol Hill get their way, Hughes will be unveiled as the secret superweapon that could produce political victory on the side of those trying to sell Ronald Reagan's and Caspar Weinberger's \$274 billion defense budget to

Congress and the American public. It may be an impossible mission, but if any one man can accomplish it, John Hughes may be the man.

Possibly without knowing it, you've heard of Hughes already. In October 1962, as the special assistant to the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Hughes examined a collection of overhead U-2 photographs and concluded that the Soviets were placing nuclear missiles in Cuba.

In February 1963, 3½ months after the Cuban missile crisis was resolved, Hughes went on nationwide television for 90 minutes, at the request of then Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, and with his pointer aimed at dozens of photos flashed before a large screen, demonstrated that the Russians had indeed removed those missiles from Cuba.

Nineteen years later, in March 1982, as deputy director of the DIA, a post he has held for the last 12 years, he appeared at a State Department press briefing and—at the request of then Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who was hellbent on proving Soviet and Cuban infiltration in El Salvador—showed a set of overhead photographs revealing Soviet and Cuban influence in neighboring Nicaragua. As evidence, he pointed out a couple dozen (1950s-vintage) Soviet tanks, a few Soviet antiaircraft guns and helicopters, "Soviet-style obstacle course," a "Soviet-style physical training area" and new military garrisons "built along Cuban design."

But the product of John Hughes that the hawks on the Hill want to share with the rest of us is a briefing called "Soviet Military Trends and Capabilities." It's an updated version of a briefing that Hughes has been delivering around town, including to Congress' Armed Services Committees, every year for nearly a decade.

This briefing is classified at a level above Top Secret. It lasts three to four hours, with only a short break for breath. It consists of literally hundreds of overhead satellite and spyplane photographs of every military installation and weapons in the U.S.S.R., painting a frightening picture of Soviet military might, of a nation that appears to be brimming over with practically nothing but arms.

Several Republicans are urging President Reagan to declassify portions of the briefing and show it to the public. One look at those pictures, they say, and the resistance to the Reagan-Weinberger defense budget will crumble at once.

Says Sen. Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), chairman of the Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, "I don't think any normal person could listen to that briefing and not come out with his hair standing straight up on his head."

Practically everyone who has heard Hughes' delivery agrees that he is a brilliant briefer. "Air of confidence," "precision," "extremely skillful," "low-key," "straight-forward," "the DIA's star salesman," "one of the best in the business . . . a model for all briefers" are just some of the rave notices given by more than a dozen past and present Pentagon officials, intelligence officers and legislators of varying ideological stripes.

Hughes has been in the intelligence business for 30 years and has picked up five distinguished service awards along the way. His early background as a geographer—he composed the large-scale maps of the world that the government freely distributed to universities after World War II—prompted the Army to assign then-Lt. Hughes to its Pentagon photo-intelligence shop in 1953.

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And it was there that Hughes became, in his words, "hooked on photo-intelligence."

"When you look at that data," he explains, still with a gleam of wonder in his eyes, "you know that you're the first one looking at that image. When you're rolling that spool, you see something no one has ever seen before, and you know that you have to present that data very effectively because it could be critically important to the security of your country."

It's that "sense of discovery"—and the knowledge that the virgin territory that he is uncovering is secret and important—that has sustained his fascination over the years.

In 1957, he dropped his service rank and became a civilian analyst in Army Intelligence, then joined the interservice DIA when it was established in 1961. From the mid-1950s on, the technology of the times and John Hughes' predilection for discovery meshed perfectly. The U-2 spyplane and then the Discovery satellite and its follow-on models were snapping thousands of photos; Hughes had plenty of spools to keep him engrossed.

And over the years, his briefings based on those spools have had a great, if largely untold, influence.

A former State Department official who still works in government recalls seeing the briefing in the mid-1970s, when it was commonly believed that as the age of detente bloomed and mellowed, the Soviets would cut back on their weapons programs. Each year the Pentagon would release statements claiming a continuing Soviet buildup, prompting nothing but cynical skepticism from State.

But then they saw the Hughes briefing. "It had a big effect on people then," the former official says, "in disabusing them of the idea that the Soviets are realigning the detente . . . The briefing was part of an intense program from within the Pentagon . . . to debunk detente—and it was successful."

Robert Komer, Harold Brown's undersecretary of defense for policy in the Jimmy Carter years, saw the annual Hughes briefing with Brown and with several visiting NATO defense ministers. He recalls: "It was impressive to them. Yes, it was impressive to Harold Brown, it was impressive to me, because this was actual, hard, physical evidence." Whenever Brown or his assistants wanted an intelligence briefing, Komer remembers, "we would tend to ask for Hughes simply because he conducted himself more professionally than others."

The annual Hughes briefing, say those who have seen it, is very dramatic. He stands behind a podium, an assistant flashing one photograph after the next, as Hughes, pointer in hand, runs down all the clues that indicate a monumental buildup. His style is the drama of understatement—straightforward, no obvious hyperbole, just the facts (some facts anyway), the overwhelming array, the panoramic display, the gruesome picture of a monstrous military powerhouse.

Says one DIA official, "It's the highly explicit character of photographs which gives his briefing the cutting edge. It simply leaps out at you . . . You look at it and say, 'Well, there it is. I can do everything but put my hands on it, so it's obviously true.'"

But now that the shock that the Soviets are indeed building weapons has worn off, once the evidence is sifted from this new perspective and some questions are posed and some distinctions made, how does the substance of the Hughes briefing hold up? What does it suggest?

Many who have seen it note its impressiveness, but claim it doesn't really mean much. One quite hawkish former Armed

Services Committee staffer who saw it several times says, "He shows you, for instance, an Oscar-class submarine, and it has X-number of cruise missiles in it, and he tells you how long it is and how wide it is, and the members of the committee say, 'Jesus Christ! Wow! But so what? What does that mean?'"

He continues: "If you ask him what it means, he doesn't answer. He deflects the question. He will categorically not do the interpretation . . . To me, it was a sideshow, it was theatricals."

William W. Kaufmann, a former special assistant to four secretaries of defense in every administration from Kennedy to Carter, says of the Hughes briefing, which he saw in the late-1970s, "It's like counting all the germs in the United States and saying we're all about to be dead."

In short, in the lingo of intelligence analysis, it is not a "net assessment." It doesn't compare the United States versus the Soviet Union, or NATO versus the Warsaw Pact; it just looks at everything the Soviets are doing in the absence of context. Several analysts observe that a similar photographic array of everything the U.S. military is doing would, in the words of one, "look pretty damn scary, too."

Even the pictures of all those weapons sometimes carry misleading impressions. "One might say," says one former high-ranking DIA officer, "that the facts which John has selected are the facts which are alarming."

Richard Stubbing, former deputy chief of the Office of Management and Budget's national security division, remembers that two years ago, the Hughes briefing "said that the [new Soviet] T-80 [tank] was going to be the sine qua non of tanks." Since then photos of the T-80 have appeared, and "we now know that the tank isn't much different from the T-72, which is not the world's greatest."

Similarly, the Soviet's new Ivan Rogov amphibious boat was played up in Hughes' briefing for a few years as a sign of the Soviets' growing ability to "project power" and intervene in the Third World. "But the thing is only half the size of [U.S. amphibious boats], and they only have one of them," says Stubbing. "What in the world will the Ivan Rogov do if it . . . runs into any kind of opposition? The entire Soviet surface Navy, after the first hour of combat, is a joke."

Other analysts note that Hughes makes much of the thousands of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) all over the U.S.S.R. Yet, says one former high-ranking CIA officer, "He'd point out lots of SAMs, but whether they were highly susceptible to jamming or spoofing tended not to be part of the presentation."

Then there is a still more fundamental question, posed by a onetime boss of Hughes', Lt. Gen. Samuel Wilson, former DIA director and, before that, the U.S. military attache in Moscow.

"I am concerned," says Wilson, "that many of the people who listen to the 'hard facts' and survey the arithmetic don't get far enough into" analyzing "the sources of Soviet conduct." Wilson believes that much of the U.S.S.R. military buildup is a product of the Soviets' preoccupation with China and West Germany, their memory of having been invaded three times this century—especially their "nightmarish" obsession with their losses during World War II, which Wilson has described as "a chin to . . . crotch" which each Soviet citizen scratches every morning "until it hurts," and with which he goes off to work in pain every day.

"Let's say you know a fellow who had an unhappy childhood and . . . has been deeply

scarred by his past," Wilson says. "He is gripped with paranoia, he's a gun nut, his house is full of weapons. And you are trying to . . . live peacefully with him. If you look only at his guns . . . and figure anytime you go around him you, too, had better be armed to the teeth, lest he gets a drop on you, then I don't think you're addressing the situation fully; you may even be complicating it."

This is not to say that the fellow isn't dangerous, says Wilson, "but—to stretch the metaphor back to the Soviets—he's so xenophobic and so suspicious that anything you say or do is likely to be misinterpreted and cause him to get even possibly further trigger-happy . . . Simply counting the guns of a fellow who is paranoid and living in a house full of guns is not the whole story."

In short, the Hughes briefing—and that style of analysis generally—says nothing about the meaning of the Soviet buildup or about what the United States should do in the face of it. Nor, for that matter, does Hughes claim to be exploring this dimension. He claims only to be showing a lot of photographs. He doesn't even explicitly state any conclusion, but, in the words of one official who has seen the briefing several times, "leaves it to the imagination of the listener."

The conclusion that one is supposed to walk away with, however, is not too difficult to miss. Those on Capitol Hill who are trying to use the briefing as a political tool in the selling of the Reagan-Weinberger defense budget are interpreting it as many in the DIA—which commonly supports the various needs of the secretary of defense—obviously have meant it to be interpreted.

Says former DIA Director Gen. Wilson: "If the Hughes briefing were to serve as a magic wand that simply causes everybody to say, 'this is horrible, we've got to approve whatever [the administration] wants,' and left it at that, I would regard it as grossly incomplete."

John Hughes is clearly a master at his trade; he's an artist, a pioneer. But the senators and congressmen who want him unleashed on the American public are playing political games. What Hughes has to say hardly speaks at all to the questions of how much we should spend on defense or of what kinds of weapons we should buy.

Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President, I yield back the balance of whatever time I have remaining.

## ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There will now be a period for the transaction of routine morning business.

## MARYLAND DAY 1983

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, last December the 97th Congress adopted a resolution which designated 1983 as the Air and Space Bicentennial, an international observance marking 200 years of manned flight. Every student knows that the first manned flight in history took place at La Mulette, France, November 21, 1783, when Montgolfier released man forever from his terrestrial shackles. But few Americans realize that just 7 months later our young Nation put one of its own citizens aloft for the first time in the New World. This is one of the earliest examples of a successful transfer